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Abstract
During the period of the War of Resistance Against 
Japan, the Nationalist Government moved westwards to 
Chongqing to defend the capital, and the national army 
established and always adhered to the “Three Gorges 
Pivotal Warfare” strategy. From the westward migration 
of the government to the Wuhan subjugation, the “Three 
Gorges Pivotal Combat” strategy has taken shape; after 
the fall of Yichang City, the National Army continued to 
counterattack, further strengthening the “Three Gorges 
Pivot Operation” strategic system. The “Three Gorges 
Pivotal Warfare” strategy in the Battle of Western Hubei 
has withstood severe tests and was further consolidated 
in the subsequent counterattack in Yichang. The national 
army’s strategy of insisting on the “Three Gorges Pivotal 
Operations” smashed the Japanese military’s attempt to 
continue westwards and defended the Chongqing’s safety 
as the capital.
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The “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” strategy of the national 
army was a defense system gradually formed after the 
Chinese government moved westwards to Chongqing, 
following the Japanese invasion of the Yangtze River 
basin and the military intimidation of the Chongqing 
National Government to protect the capital. After the 
fall of Wuhan, the safety of the capital of Chongqing 
was further threatened. The Three Gorges area with 
Yichang at the starting point has become the last line of 
defense for the Chongqing city. Therefore, taking the 
Three Gorges as the operational pivot and sticking to the 
Three Gorges area, the strategy of defending the capital 
is highlighted. The relationship between the formation 
and implementation of the “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” 
strategy and the safety of the capital, Chongqing, is 
of great historical significance. I intend to analyze the 
formation of the whole story.
1. THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE “THREE 
GORGES PIVOT WARFARE” STRATEGY
The westward migration of the Chinese government 
and the fall of Wuhan have become the initial reason 
for the formation of the “Three Gorges Pivotal Warfare” 
strategy. During this period, the “Three Gorges Pivot 
Warfare” strategy was initially formed. After” The 813 
Incident” broke out, the Nanjing National Government 
issued a declaration of self-defense and the Battle of 
Shanghai broke out. Although the military and civilians 
fought with loyalty and vowed to fight against the 
enemy, the Chinese defeat in the battle of Shanghai 
took place in mid-November 1937. The Japanese troops 
marched westwards, pressing hard against Nanjing. On 
November 20th, the National Government issued the 
Declaration of Chongqing: “The Nationalist Government 
is to adapt to the situation and to coordinate the overall 
situation. For the sake of long-term combat, it will move 
to Chongqing today.” (Zhang, 1997, p.27) The capital 
moved to Chongqing as a “central hub to the hinterland, 
and the heads of the people are stable.” (Ibid., pp.27-
28) This has become the origin of the “Government 
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of the Three Gorges Pivot” strategy of the Nationalist 
Government. Therefore, in February 1938, the National 
Army formulated The Defensive Plan and the Fort Setting 
Between Yichang and a Battle Plan Near by Yichang.”1 
built a fortification from the Yichang to Wushan between 
the two sides of the Three Gorges. Not only that, but from 
July to October in 1938, the Military Commission issued 
The Military Commission’s Work on the Deployment 
of Works in Yichang, Xiangyang, both in Northwest of 
Hubei Province, etc. and The Military Commission’s 
Position on the Site of the Western Hubei as Yichang, 
Jiangling, Shayang, etc. North Hunan and Western Hubei 
fortification deployment, etc.2 Repeatedly called for 
strengthening the defense system.
Although the National Government moved to 
Chongqing, the main government departments moved 
to Wuhan. Therefore, the “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” 
strategy began to show itself after the fall of Wuhan. After 
the fall of Wuhan, although the War of Resistance Against 
Japanese Aggression entered the phase of stalemate, 
the Japanese army did not stop the pace of Westward 
invasion. The security of the capital Chongqing needs 
to be further consolidated and strengthened. Yichang is 
the starting point of the “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” 
strategy. It is located at the entrance of the Three Gorges. 
To defend Yichang is to defend the Three Gorges and 
to defend the Three Gorges is to defend Chongqing. In 
view of this, in 1939, The National Army Formulated the 
“Yichang Garrison Headquarters 28-Year Winter Defense 
Implementation Plan”3 This detailed plan reflected that 
the national army attaches great importance to the defense 
of the “Three Gorges Pivot Strategy” fulcrum Yichang 
City. In order to prevent the Japanese army from attacking 
the river and threaten the capital city of Chongqing, the 
Military Commission also strengthened the guarding of 
Yichang on the deployment of the army. In January 1939, 
the commander of the Second Fleet of the Chinese Navy 
had stationed Yichang with the Second Fleet; in April, the 
upper Yangtze River defense headquarters was established 
in Yichang, where Guo Wei was the commander of the 
defense force. About 100,000 people belonged to the fifth 
1 Department of Defense’s Bureau of History and Political Affairs 
and History of Warfare Committee. (Ed.). (1938). The defensive 
plan and the fort setting between Yichang and a battle plan near 
by Yichang (pp.787-3360). China Second Historical Archives 
Collection. 
2 Department of Defense’s Bureau of History and Political Affairs 
and History of Warfare Committee. The Military Commission of the 
People’s Republic of China in Hubei Province, Yichang, Xiangyang, 
and other places for the deployment of telecommunications, The 
Military Commission on the Western Hubei Yichang Jiangling 
Shayang “Positions and other sites for the construction of text 
and electricity, Northern Hunan and Western Hubei fortification 
deployment text (pp.787-3361, 3362, 3372). 
3 Ministry of Defense history and political history compilation 
committee. (1940). Yichang garrison headquarters winter defense 
implementation plan (pp.787-1372). China Second Historical 
Archives Collection. 
theater. At the same time, from the Second Historical 
Archives in China, “The Commander of the Yangtze River 
in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, Guo Yan, in 
Yichang Military Texts” (January 1939 - May 1939), “The 
Five Warzone Guo Yan in Yichang Military Textbook” 
(1939) February of February - April 1940, “Chairman 
of Hubei Province Yan Lisan in Yichang Military Texts” 
(April 1939 - July 1939), “Military Commander Liu 
Fei reported to adjust the Yangtze defense strategy in 
the upper reaches of the Yangtze River” (In 1939, etc., 
from the “787” series of archival materials, the Jianghu 
Command in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River and 
Hubei Province carried out careful military planning to 
strengthen the guards in the Yichang area. In April 1939, 
Feng Yuxiang, vice chairman of the Nationalist Military 
Committee, personally came to Yichang to inspect and 
supervise the military to check on the fortress. Yichang’s 
military deployment and defensive and Feng Yuxiang’s 
inspections further demonstrated that the status of the 
“Three Gorges Pivot Operation” strategy has gradually 
emerged after the fall of Wuhan.
2. “THREE GORGES PIVOT OPERATION” 
S T R A T E G I C  C O N S T R U C T I O N 
STRENGTHENING PERIOD
The “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” strategy is fully 
highlighted after the fall of Yichang City and further 
strengthening of the strategic system. In May 1940, 
the Japanese army gathered six divisions, and was 
accompanied by the fleet of the Chinese demobilized fleet 
and the aviation forces. It suddenly launched Yichang 
operations, namely the “ZaoYi battle.” Due to strategic 
misjudgments in the previous period and misguided 
commands in the course of the ZaoYi battle, the Chinese 
army was defeated Yichang was occupied by the Japanese. 
The fall of Yichang has severely impacted the “Three 
Gorges Pivotal Operations” strategy of the Chinese 
military. Regarding the grim situation caused by the fall 
of Yichang, the Japanese has described it like this: “In the 
8 years of the Sino-Japanese War, the time when President 
Chiang Kai-shek most felt the crisis was when Yichang 
was fighting.”4 Chiang Kai-shek also wrote in his diary: 
“The events in the Western Hubei Province and Annan are 
out of order. Since the end of the War of Resistance, there 
have been no such hardships and hardships.... Annan’s 
suspension has been painful. However, the key to the 
success of Yichang was better than that of Annan’s” (Wu 
& Cao, 2011, p. 314)  Under this circumstance, in order 
to adhere to the Three Gorges, arches, and defend the 
4 Defense Agency History and Defense Office of the Japanese 
Defense Agency. (1979). History of China’s incident army operation 
(Q. Z. Tian, Trans. volume 3, second volume, p.28). Zhonghua Book 
Company.
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city, the sixth battle area was reset. Its main jurisdiction is 
the Three Gorges area in western Hubei, southern Hubei, 
central Hubei, northern Hunan, western Hunan, and 
eastern Sichuan.”After the re-establishment of the Sixth 
War Zone, its importance is greatly behind the trend. It 
is the general view that the focus of the Anti-Japanese 
War was at that time was the Sixth War Zone. In a major 
gathering place, the chairman of the committee proposed 
publicly the “Military Division”. The slogans of “First, 
Sixth War Zone” can imagine the general situation of the 
overall situation of the Anti-Japanese War at that time 
(Chen, 2009, p.103). At the same time, in July 1940, the 
Military Command of the National Armed Forces Military 
Commission formulated the Armed Guardian Operation 
Plan. The plan’s policy states: 
The national army should always ensure the Three Gorges 
project to prevent the enemy from entering Sichuan. It should 
be considered as the axis of warfare. It should be based on the 
Three Gorges and its mountains in the north and south, breaking 
the roads, clearing the terrain, strengthening the terrain, and 
using frontal tough resistance. In addition, they attacked the 
enemy’s supply lines and annihilated the enemies of the Three 
Gorges in the north and south mountains. 5 
The geostrategic axis of the Three Gorges region 
during the Anti-Japanese War was formally put forward in 
this plan. The plan proposes to actively call for a decisive 
battle with the enemy, and the decisive battle zone is 
expected to be on both sides of the Qingjiang River in the 
southern region of the Three Gorges. This area became the 
main battlefield for the future battle of Hubei. However, 
at this time, the sixth theater, which is directly responsible 
for this zone, is still adhering to a defensive strategy and is 
supplemented by attacks: “Ninth, sixth and fifth war zones 
temporarily took the defensive, but each part took part in 
guerrillas, hindered the enemy from rest and searched for 
enemy situations, and covered the main forces to build 
fortifications and actively trained.”6
After the fall of Yichang, the national army had 
planned to recover Yichang several times. As in May 
1941, the military headquarters drafted the “National 
Offensive Operation Plan” with the main purpose of 
“recovering Yisha”. In the military aspect, the Japanese 
army launched a fierce battle, hoping to recapture 
Yichang by military means. From November 1940 to 
November 1941, the National Army and the Japanese 
Army successively took place the battle of Nanjin Pass, 
the second West Coast Battle of Yichang, the four Yuanan 
Battles, the second Fenxiang battle, the Haoxue Battle, 
Jing Yi in the vicinity of Yichang. Offensive operations 
and other 11 battles. Especially in September 1941, during 
the second Changsha battle, the highest commander 
5 The Republic of China History Archives Information Collection. 
(2000). the fifth series, the second series of military (p.672). Phoenix 
Press. 
6 Ibid.
of the National Army wanted to seize the opportunity. 
When the main force of the Japanese army was attracted 
to North Hunan, it mobilized all the strength of the 
sixth theater to attack the Japanese troops stationed in 
Yichang and recover Yichang. However, due to the rapid 
return of aid from the Japanese army and the large-scale 
use of poisonous gas, the defeat of the national army 
was completed. In order to stabilize the Three Gorges 
defensive line in the west bank of Yichang, the national 
army formulated the “Operation Plan for the Sixth War 
Zone, Arches and Guards, Operation Plan, and Six-War 
Area Operational Contingency Plan”, heavily deployed in 
the Yichang Jiangnan area, and along Tianzhu Mountain, 
Muqiao Creek, Langping, and Shipai.At the frontline of 
the game, the key is to build a strong fortification and 
form a solid defense line for the Three Gorges. At this 
point, after the fall of Yichang City, the National Army 
formed the “Three Gorges Pivotal Warfare” strategy.
After the fall of Yichang, China and Japan were 
basically in confrontation in Yichang. As the starting point 
for the “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” strategy, not only 
does the national army want to defend itself and recover 
lost ground, the Japanese army also wants to break through 
the line of defense and continue westward. On March 11, 
1942, Xu Yongchang Was Drafted With Status Judgments 
and the Draft of the National Army’s Summer Offensive 
Strategy Report for the First Year of the Thirty-One Years, 
which made Yichang one of the positive targets for the 
Yangtze River basin. The combat plan is based on the 
reduction in the strength of the Chinese battlefield on the 
Chinese battlefield following the launch of the Pacific War 
by the Japanese military, and in particular the significant 
decrease in aviation forces. The Japanese military’s 
strength is stretched, and it can only be developed under 
the premise of offensive and passive. In this case, the 
national army should take the initiative to attack, because 
“Huazhong is the heart of my heart, especially Yichang’s 
Sichuan portal and Yueyang’s throat is Sanxiang. We 
should take advantage of the Raiders and liberate the 
enemy’s shackles. It is easy to fight afterwards.”7 At the 
same time, he believed that “the United States and Britain 
have repeatedly suffered setbacks in the South Pacific, 
and it is even more necessary for me to urgently launch 
a powerful counterattack, with a view to alleviating 
the pressure from the enemy’s enemies. I also should 
attack the entire communist ally, attacking with a total 
counterattack by the Allied Army. “Preliminary.”8 In 
addition, he pointed out the main objective of the attack: 
“Only the military supplies of the national army are not 
easy to supplement, and the situation in North China is 
very special. It is difficult to fully counterattack, so it is 
only necessary to recapture Yichang for satisfaction.”9 Just 
7 Ibid., p. 694. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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on April 16 of the same year, Japanese military officials 
began to discuss the so-called “Sichuan Warfare.” This 
idea soon evolved into “Sichuan Offensive Operations”, 
referred to as 51 operations. Its main content is: “With an 
area from Xi’an and Baoji, a combat operation was carried 
out from Yichang to destroy the main force of Chongqing 
Army and to capture other important areas of Chongqing, 
Chengdu and Sichuan Province.”10 The plan was revised 
by the Japanese army and was renamed “Operation 5” 
on August 30th. “This battle is not the continuation of the 
50th operation, but the two sides of the North China and 
Central China offensive operations in Sichuan.”11 The 
battle plans of both sides have not been achieved in the end, 
but they fully demonstrate both the importance attached to 
the Three Gorges area and the strategic significance of the 
Three Gorges area on the battlefield between China and 
Japan.
3. “THREE GORGES PIVOT OPERATION” 
STRATEGY TEST AND CONSOLIDATION 
PERIOD
After the formation of the “Three Gorges Pivotal 
Warfare” strategy of the National Army, its important 
strategic significance was fully reflected in the battle in 
Western Hubei. The outbreak of the Battle of Western 
Hubei has become a concrete practice of the “Three 
Gorges Pivotal Operation” strategy of the National 
Army, and it is also a rigorous test of this strategy. In 
May 1943, the 11th Army Commander of the Japanese 
Army, Yokoyama Yoshiro, collected 100,000 Japanese 
troops in an awkward manner and attempted to wipe 
out the main force of the Chinese Army in the sixth 
battle zone on the southern bank of the Yangtze River 
from Yichang to Yuezhou, and to open up Yangtze 
River shipping from Yichang to Shashi. On May 5, the 
Japanese Army launched the “Destruction of War in 
the South of the Yangtze River,” that is, “The Battle of 
Western Hubei.” The Japanese army made large-scale 
attacks on the Changde region of northwestern Hunan. 
In less than half of a month, the soldiers’ fronts against 
the fortress of the first river in the Xiajiang River. On 
May 26, The Operational Plan for Arches and Warners 
of the Military Command of the Military Commission of 
the National Armed Forces once again followed the 1941 
operational policy, that is,
The National Army has always made sure that the Three Gorges 
are the operational pivot, and that the Yiyi Three Gorges and its 
In the north-southern mountainous region, with frontal resistance 
10 Japanese War Department history] Institute of the War History 
Office. (1987). The history of Japanese Militarism invading China 
(Tianjin Municipal CPPCC Compilation Committee Trans., p.365). 
Chinese Book, Sichuan People’s Publishing House.
11 Ibid.
and side-behind tail-tail strikes, the enemies’ supply lines were 
cut off, and the enemies who invaded the enemy were ensconced 
in the south-north mountain range of the Three Gorges.12
This is a manifestation of the strategy of the National 
Army to consistently adhere to the “Three Gorges Pivotal 
Warfare” strategy. Around the 26th, the Japanese army 
broke through the Qingjiang defense line.13 The striker 
reached the forefront of the fortress of the Shipai fortress.14 
Because the PLA has always adhered to the “Three 
Gorges Pivotal Warfare” strategy, it has established sturdy 
fortifications in the Three Gorges area and deployed a 
total of seventeenth, 32nd, 86th, 87th, 94th, 79th, and 74th 
forces. The army’s strength, plus the combat forces of the 
44th and 77th forces, was as much as 140,000. They swear 
to guard the stone fortress to protect the capital. From 
29th to 30th, Japanese troops stormed Shipai fortresses at 
the perimeter of Shipai. I defended the army tenaciously. 
At the same time, the United States and China’s joint air 
force took the initiative to fight with the army to smash 
the Japanese military’s attempt to break through the 
stone fortress. The Japanese attack did not take place, 
and his own casualties were heavy. The offensive was 
drastically reduced. He was forced to withdraw eastward 
on the evening of the 31st. I escorted the various troops to 
counterattack and pursued the Japanese army. By June 3, 
all fronts had returned to their pre-war status. The victory 
in the Western Hubei Campaign can be said to be closely 
related to the PLA’s strategy of always adhering to the 
“Three Gorges Pivotal Combat” strategy, and at the same 
time, it also validates the correctness and importance 
of the “Three Gorges Pivotal Operation” strategy of the 
national army.
After the battle in western Hubei, the national army 
continued to adhere to the “Three Gorges Pivotal Warfare” 
strategy. To further consolidate the “Three Gorges Pivotal 
Warfare” strategy, it repeatedly launched a campaign to 
recover Yichang. From 1943 to 1944, the national army 
formulated the Reconstructing the Yisha Battle Plan for 
the Sixth Battlefield and The Sixth Battlefield Recaptures 
the Yisha Defence Division Wuhan Operation Plan. “After 
the attack on the sixth theater zone, it focused on the east 
side of Yichang and the enemy’s bridgehead position on 
the west bank of Yichang. In combat deployment, the main 
group 26 armies of the sixth theater point to the area east 
of Yichang, and the 33 group armor points to Jing’an and 
nearby areas. , and prepare to enter and leave the Shayang. 
The main armies of the armed forces to attack Yichang on 
the other side of the bridgehead. With the 10 group army, 
24 group army attack the right enemy, the 10group army 
12 ROC History Archives. (2000). Series 5, No. Section II, Military (I) 
(p.706). Phoenix Press. 
13 Qingjiang defense line combat area is mainly in today’s 
Changyang County, Yichang. 
14 Shipai fortress frontier main battle area in this point of the Yichang 
City Military District. 
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support Dujiang, the strategy of Yichang.”15 By launching 
the summer offensive, the second counterattack on the 
West Bank of Yichang, fighting against the South of the 
Shonan and the joint air force of the China-U.S. Joint Air 
Force, the outfield positions of the Yichang Japanese were 
severely hit. By counterattacking Yichang, the “Three 
Gorges Pivotal Operation” strategy has been further 
stabilized.
CONCLUSION
Since the fall of Nanjing, the government moved 
westwards. In order to consolidate the safety of the capital, 
Chongqing has gradually formed the “Three Gorges 
Pivotal Warfare” strategy to build a solid defense system 
in the Three Gorges region. The “Three Gorges Pivot 
Warfare” strategy has been continuously strengthened 
with the changes in the war situation. After the fall of 
15 Republic of China history file Information Collection. (2000). 
Series 5, Part Two, Military (I) (p.712). Phoenix Press. 
Yichang, the “Three Gorges Pivot Warfare” strategy 
has always been the strategic thinking for the national 
army to resist the Japanese army and ensure the safety of 
Chongqing. It was precisely because of the formation and 
practice of this strategic ideology that the victory in the 
Battle of Western Hubei was achieved, the Three Gorges 
area was firmly controlled, the attempt of the Japanese 
army to enter Chongqing in the west was crushed, and the 
security of the capital was guarded.
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